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Pursuant to the practice of the Juvenile Court and The District Court, Petitioner- 
Appellant Aaron Smith is referred to as “Aaron” and Respondent-Appellee Rocio Smith 
is referred to as “Rocio”. 
JURISDICTION 
1. This Court has original jurisdiction over an appeal from a final order from a District 
Court Order pursuant to Utah Code § 78A-4-103(h). 
 2. Pursuant to the requirements of Utah R. App. P. Rule 3(a), Petitioner Aaron Smith 
filed a Notice of Appeal in the District Court on November 25, 2015. Therein, he identified 
both the April 6, 2015 Order (“April Order,”) and the October 27, 2015 Order (October 
Order”). (A copy of the April Order is attached hereto as Exhibit #4, the copy of the 
October Order is attached hereto as Exhibit #6, and both are incorporated herein by this 
reference.  
3. Because of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (“U.R.C.P.”) Rule 59 Motion, the 
material differences between the April Order and the October Order, plus lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction of  the District Court and denial of due process, the appeal is timely 
filed on November 25, 2015 as required by Utah R. App. P. Rule 4(a). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
 
Issue # 1: Was Aaron’s URCP 59 Motion regarding the April Order timely and 
actionable? 
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Standard of Review:    Timeliness and conformance with  U.R.C.P. Rules 6(b) and 59(e)            
is determined as a matter of law.1   Nonetheless, “[a] trial Court faced with an insufficient 
motion has the discretion to deny the motion or allow the party who filed the motion to 
supplement it.”2   
Issue # 2: Did the October Order constitute a material change or amendment of  
the April Order? 
Standard of Review:  “[An Appellate] court must determine whether the trial court’s 
modification was clerical or material.” "3   
   Issue # 3: Did the District Court have the jurisdictional authority to change and 
expand the Juvenile Court’s limited mandate on remand from the Utah Court of Appeals 
regarding the 2013 Final Juvenile Court Order?  
Standard of Review:    "[T]he propriety of [a] jurisdictional determination, … becomes a 
question of law upon which we do not defer to the District Court."4  
 Issue # 4: Did the Juvenile Court have jurisdictional authority to certify to the     
District Court for later decision undefined and unexplained  amounts of attorney fees, 
costs and expenses incurred in proceedings held previously in the Juvenile Court? 
                                                     
1 Sanpete America, LLC v. Willardsen, 2011 UT 48, nine ¶¶ 66-68, 269 P.3d 118. A trial 
court had granted a U.R.C.P. Rule 59 Motion that had been filed several days late. The 
Supreme Court reversed, stating that the "only course of action was to deny the motion. 
We therefore reverse … to the extent that it granted Mr. Neeley's Rule 59 Motion." Id. at 
¶ 68. 
2 Blosch v. Natixis Real Estate Capital Inc., 2013 UT App 214 ¶ 17, 311 P.3d 1042. 
3 Hansen v. Kik, 2006 UT App 314 ¶ 7, 142 P.3d 558. 
4 Johnson v. Johnson, 2010 UT 28 ¶ 6, 234 P.3d 1100. 
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Standard of Review: "[T]he propriety of [a] jurisdictional determination, … becomes a 
question of law upon which we do not defer to the District Court."5  
Issue #5:     Did the District Court have jurisdictional authority to award attorney 
fees, costs and expenses to Rocio pursuant to Utah Code § 30-3-3  when the proceedings 
where they were incurred were in another Court with terminated jurisdiction and where 
no such award was properly entered?  
Standard of Review: "[T]he propriety of [a] jurisdictional determination, … becomes a 
question of law upon which we do not defer to the District Court."6  
Issue # 6:  Did the District Court deny and violate due process, thus making its 
judgment void, when it failed to afford Aaron a meaningful opportunity to be heard and 
when it did not require Rocio to allocate requested fees, costs and expenses according to 
competing causes of action and petitions to terminate parental rights and did not identify 
or determine what constituted a prevailing party and prevailing claim? 
Standard of Review: "[T]he propriety of [a] jurisdictional determination, … becomes a 
question of law upon which we do not defer to the District Court."7  
Issue # 7:  Did the District Court deny and violate due process, thus making its 
judgment void, when it failed to afford Aaron meaningful opportunity to be heard and 
when it did not allow an evidentiary hearing on Aaron’s request for identification and 
allocation of fees, costs and expenses according to competing causes of action and 
                                                     
5 Johnson v. Johnson, 2010 UT 28 ¶ 6, 234 P.3d 1100. 
6 Johnson v. Johnson, 2010 UT 28 ¶ 6, 234 P.3d 1100. 
7 Johnson v. Johnson, 2010 UT 28 ¶ 6, 234 P.3d 1100 
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petitions to terminate parental rights and determination of what constituted a prevailing 
party and claim? 
Standard of Review: "[T]he propriety of [a] jurisdictional determination, … becomes a 
question of law upon which we do not defer to the District Court."8  
DETERMINATIVE LAWS  
Statutes 
 
Utah Code § 30-3-3(1):   
 
In any action filed under Title 30, Chapter 3, Divorce, Chapter 4, Separate 
Maintenance, or Title 78B, Chapter 7, Part 1, Cohabitant Abuse Act, and in 
any action to establish an order of custody, parent-time, child support, 
alimony, or division of property in a domestic case, the court may order a 
party to pay the costs, attorney fees, and witness fees, including expert 
witness fees, of the other party to enable the other party to prosecute or 
defend the action. The order may include provision for costs of the action.  
 
Utah Code § 30-3-3(2):   
 
In any action to enforce an order of custody, parent-time, child support, 
alimony, or division of property in a domestic case, the court may award 
costs and attorney fees upon determining that the party substantially 
prevailed upon the claim or defense. The court, in its discretion, may award 
no fees or limited fees against a party if the court finds the party is 
impecunious or enters in the record the reason for not awarding fees. 
 
Utah Code § 30-3-3(3):  
“In any action listed in Subsection (1), the court may order a party to provide money, 
during the pendency of the action, for the separate support and maintenance of the 
other party and of any children in the custody of the other party.” 
 
                                                     
8 Johnson v. Johnson, 2010 UT 28 ¶6, 234 P.3d 1100 
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Utah Code § 30-3-3(4):  
“Orders entered under this section prior to entry of the final order or judgment may 
be amended during the course of the action or in the final order or judgment.” 
Rules of Civil Procedure 
U RCP Rule 54 (b) states that:  
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple parties. When 
an action presents more than one claim for relief-whether as a claim, 
counterclaim, cross claim, or third party claim-and/or when multiple parties 
are involved, the court may enter judgment as to one or more but fewer than 
all of the claims or parties only if the court expressly determines that there is 
no just reason for delay. Otherwise, any order or other decision, however 
designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and 
liabilities of fewer than all the parties does not end the action as to any of the 
claims or parties, and may be changed at any time before the entry of 
judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the 
parties. 
U.R.C.P. Rule 59(b) states that “[a] motion for a new trial shall be served not later than 
14 days after the entry of the judgment.”  
U.R.C.P. Rule 6(b)(2) provides that “[a] Court must not extend the time to act under 
Rules 50(b) and (c), 52(b), 59(b), (d) and (e), and 60(b).” 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case  
This is an appeal from an award of $180,780.47 in attorney’s fees, costs and expenses 
awarded to Rocio and against Aaron by the District Court. Said sum and award are 
attributable to prior Juvenile Court Proceedings and not in District Court and came after 
the Juvenile Court terminated its jurisdiction without taking such action on its own and 
following a limited remand by the Court of Appeals, which raised no such issue or claim 
by Respondent Rocio.    
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Course of Proceedings 
In the primary and underlying divorce proceedings, the district Court granted 
primary custody of the children to Aaron.  Alarming evidence of misconduct by Rocio 
during visitation led to protections put in place by the District court and the granting of 
sole custody to Aaron.  This lead to the filing of competing petitions and proceedings in 
Juvenile Court to terminate the parental rights of each other.  Ultimately, neither party 
prevailed on their respective petitions for affirmative relief. However, Counsel for Rocio 
seeks to collect fees in excess of $180,000.00 and without any allocation as to a prevailing 
claim and numerous substantive and procedural disqualifying errors.  During the course of 
the Juvenile Court proceedings, Aaron experienced some confusion with his former 
counsel and this resulted in a subsequent appeal by him as to contempt charges raised in 
the Juvenile Court.  The Court of Appeals vacated the prior Juvenile Court rulings and 
remanded for the limited purpose of resolving any issue of alleged prior contempt and 
provide full due process through evidentiary hearing.  Rocio chose to not cross-appeal and 
failed to raise any claim of entitlement to attorney fees, costs and expenses in the Juvenile 
Court proceedings.  The Juvenile Court satisfied the Appellate mandate and found by 
stipulation two minor infractions for which Aaron and his wife paid a fine.  The Juvenile 
Court then terminated its jurisdiction and referred the parties back to the District Court in 
the continuing divorce case as it relates to child support and visitation.  Rocio’s Counsel 
then sought to move, after the fact, in District Court for an award of fees and costs allegedly 
due to him in the prior Juvenile Court proceedings.  The District Court summarily granted 
Rocio’s motion without hearing and oral argument and without any allocation and no 
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identification of a prevailing party and prevailing claim.  COMES NOW Appellant Aaron 
and appeals the District Court action as set forth herein.  
On April 20-21, 2015, Aaron filed documents associated with a U.R.C.P. Rule 59 
motion.  October 27, 2015, the District Court denied Aaron’s Motion.  The District Court 
operated on the false and mistaken assumption that (a) the Juvenile Court issued a prior 
valid award for attorney’s fees, costs and expenses; (b) Rocio’s counsel filed a timely 
motion to award such fees, costs and expenses; (c) the District Court inherited and held 
some form of successor jurisdiction from the Juvenile Court regarding any and all matters 
and with no interruption or unsatisfied substantive prerequisites; (d) no hearing and no 
allocation of proportionality or identification of prevailing parties and claims. 
Aaron filed a Notice of Appeal on November 25, 2015 from both Orders. 
Disposition at District Court 
The District Court awarded attorney’s fees, costs and expenses to Rocio and against Aaron 
on April 6, 2015. The District Court denied Aaron’s U.R.C.P. 59 Motion on October 27, 
2015.  
FACTS  
This factual summary addresses primarily subject matter jurisdiction, or “the relationship 
between the claim and the forum that allows for the exercise of jurisdiction."9  In this 
matter, the Juvenile Court and District Court respectively acted beyond their jurisdiction 
                                                     
9 Johnson v. Johnson, 2010 UT 28 ¶ 9, 234 P.3d 1100 (quote marks and citation omitted.) 
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given the facts and circumstances before them at the time of their actions. Further, the 
District Court acted without a full and accurate understanding of the prior Juvenile Court 
proceedings and the impact of the Court of Appeals limited remand.  In these instances, 
the court lacked authority to adjudicate the case in such manner and reversal on appeal is 
warranted and respectfully requested.   
1. On April 29, 2013, the Juvenile Court issued a final order in the proceedings 
involving the parties.  It contains a prior sua sponte reference to attorney fees, costs and 
expenses but no amounts are specified or allocated based on a defined sum and who 
prevailed and in what proportion and on what claims. (“2013 Final Juvenile Order”.) 
(Record at 0898-0901.) 
2.  On May 13, 2013, Aaron filed his Notice of Appeal regarding the April 29, 
2013 court decision.  (Record at 0844-0846.) 
3. Two days later, on May 15, 2013 and while the appeal was then pending,  
Rocio filed a motion and affidavit in Juvenile Court, listing attorney fees, costs and 
expenses allegedly applicable to the prior termination of parental rights trials in Juvenile 
Court and DCFS child welfare petition as well as the initial divorce and child custody 
proceedings in District Court. (See Record 0552-00556;) 
4. At the same time, Rocio did not file a cross-appeal seeking to have the 
Juvenile Court identify an amount of fees, costs and expenses to which she claimed to be 
entitled. ) 
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5. On June 4, 2013, Rocio filed a memorandum objecting to the Petition on 
Appeal filed by Aaron.  Rocio asked for attorney fees to be incurred in responding to the 
appeal but raised no claim for any attorney’s fees in the lower Court. (Record at 0866.) 
6. On September 6, 2013, the Utah Court of Appeals issued its ruling regarding 
Aaron’s appeal. See State of Utah ex. rel. E.S. and N.S., A.S. and J.S. v. State of  Utah and 
R.S., 2013 UT App 222, 319 P.3d 744. (hereinafter “In re E.S”.)  
7. The Appellate opinion dealing with the Juvenile Court ruling of April 29, 
2013 states: “[W]e vacate the findings of contempt and the sanctions imposed, and remand 
for a hearing on the allegations of contempt. The juvenile court's order is affirmed in all 
respects except for the determination of contempt, the findings of contempt are vacated, 
and the matter is remanded to the Juvenile Court for a hearing on the contempt 
allegations.”10  No authority was given to address or award attorney fees, costs or expenses 
on remand.  The only conceivable exception would be if it was found to be a function of 
contempt and it was NOT.   Again, the Juvenile Court award does not include a specific 
and valid award of attorney’s fees.  This fundamental fact is at the center of the cascading 
mistaken assumptions and assertions over the course of the prior proceedings in the lower 
court and which now bring this matter full circle to the Court of Appeals.  
8. On December 13, 2014, Juvenile Court Senior Judge Sterling Sainsbury held 
a hearing regarding the Appellate mandate regarding contempt. (Record at 0882.) On 
January 23, 2014, Judge Sainsbury executed an Order detailing how he met and satisfied 
                                                     
10 In re E,S,, 2013 UT App 222 ¶¶ 8-9, 319 P.3d 744. 
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the remand from the Court of Appeals. (Two minor incidents were addressed, which 
resulted from confusion attributable to prior explanation to Aaron from former counsel). 
This Order will be referred to as the “Final Contempt Order.”  A copy of the Order is 
incorporated herein as Exhibit #1).  Relevant portions include the following:  
¶ 1.    Upon mandate from the Court of Appeals to conduct contempt 
proceedings against Father and Stepmother, the Court set a hearing for 
December 13, 2013. Judge Sainsbury, Senior Judge, was assigned to hear 
the case. … 
 
¶ 6.      The Court finds that both the Father and Stepmother violated the 
Court's orders on two separate occasions as stated above and finds that said 
conduct constitutes actions in contempt of the Court. The Court further 
finds that the parties' admission to [such] counts of contempt satisfies the 
interests of justice and that there should be no further proceedings on the 
remaining contempt charges vacated by the Court of Appeals. 
 
(Exhibit # 1, ¶¶ 1,6.) 
 
9. On March 17, 2014, Judge Sainsbury entered the “Order of Hearing 
(January 16, 2014,)” (hereinafter “Final Juvenile Court Order.”)  (Record at 0884.) (A 
copy of this Order is attached as Exhibit # 2 and is incorporated by this reference.)  All 
motions except Rocio’s untimely request for attorney fees were resolved in Juvenile 
Court, and “the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court was terminated.” (Exhibit # 2 at 1, ¶ 1 
and at 3 ¶ 14.)  At that time, there was no pending matter in District Court. 
10. Neither party filed a request for certification under U.R.C.P. Rule 54(b) 
regarding post-judgment motions or appeal from the Final Juvenile Court Order. 
11. On May 6, 2014 and after the Juvenile Court terminated its jurisdiction 
and made no such award, Rocio filed in District Court a motion for attorney’s fees and 
costs and accompanying documents including an affidavit. (Again without any allocation 
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of attorney fees, costs, expenses and prevailing claims. (Record at Page 0472) (If this 
matter was supposedly previously resolved by Juvenile Court Order, why was a further 
untimely and unfounded motion again attempted by Rocio in District Court?) 
12. Rocio’s affidavit on May 6,2014 in the District court was the same as 
what she previously filed untimely in Juvenile Court after the issuance of the April 29, 
2013 Order.  (Record at 0898). Thus, a repeated and again untimely and improper motion 
brought in yet another court for the same claims.   
13. On March 10, 2015, the District Court entered its initial memorandum 
ruling rejecting the objections made by Aaron regarding award of attorney’s fees, costs 
and expenses to Rocio. (Record at 0705; hereinafter “March Ruling”.) A copy is attached 
hereto as Exhibit #3 is incorporated herein by this reference.  The Court did so without 
any analysis of the amount or the substantive and procedural history of the claims 
brought by Rocio.    
14. On April 6, 2015, the District Court executed the Order prepared by 
Rocio’s counsel. (Record at 1094; hereinafter “April Order”. ) A copy is attached hereto 
as Exhibit # 4 and is incorporated herein by this reference. 
15. In the April Order, the Court sought to distinguish significant precedent 
regarding what constitutes a prior and continuing waiver by Rocio of the subject claim to 
more than $189,000.00 in unexplained and unallocated fees, costs and expenses:  
16 . In Kendall, the Court of Appeals held that because the prevailing party 
did not submit a claim for attorney’s fees, they waived the attorney fees 
issues once the case went on appeal. Kendall Insurance, Inc. v. R & R 
Group, Inc., 2000 UT App 235, ¶ 29. 
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15. Aaron Smith [Aaron herein] correctly argues that, if a party fails to 
submit a claim for attorney’s fees in a timely fashion, they may have 
waived the attorney fee issues. Id. at ¶ 29. 
 
16. Unlike in Kendall, Rocio Smith [Rocio herein] timely filed an affidavit 
for fees and costs less than two weeks after the Juvenile Court entered its 
Order. 
 
17. In this matter, Rocio did timely submit her Affidavit of Attorney Fees 
and Costs.  Thus, there was no waiver.   
 
(Exhibit # 3 , ¶¶ 14-17.) (emphasis added.) 
 
17. However, based on the Juvenile Court’s time stamp, subsequent 
confirmation by the District Court shows that this was a false and mistaken assumption.  
Rocio was two days late and only filed her motion with the Juvenile Court after Aaron 
filed his notice of appeal two days before.  (See Record at 0552-0056.) 
18. On April 20, 2015, Aaron filed and served on all parties, by electronic 
filing, his Memorandum in Support pursuant to U. R.C.P. Rule 59 and Motion to Alter or 
Amend including  10 exhibits.  The electronic filing process separates and controls the 
sequence and receipt of the filed documents but all are related and part of a single and 
consolidated filing with the Court. 
19. On October 27, 2015 an Order was filed by the District Court denying the 
U.R.C.P. Rule 59 motion filed by the Aaron. (Record at 1195.)  
20. Rather than address and correct its earlier false and mistaken assumption as 
to the timeliness of Rocio’s motion, the Court stated the following regarding the October 
27, 2015 Order (hereinafter “October Order”) :  
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a. “Aaron Smith (Aaron) moves this Court under Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 59, to reverse its March 10, 2015 Ruling and its Judgment and 
Order of April 6, 2015.” (October Order, Exhibit #4, at 1, ¶ 1); 
 
b. Additional information and arguments reviewed by the District Court 
pursuant to “an insufficiency of the evidence to justify … decision, [Utah R. 
Civ. P. 59(a)(6)] or an “[e]rror in law.” [Utah R. Civ. P. 59(a)(7)] (Id. at 2, ¶ 
3); 
 
c. Rule 59 is contingent upon Rule 61 which states that: 
[N]o error or defect in any ruling or order …  is ground for granting a new 
trial or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such 
action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at 
every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the 
proceeding, which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties. (Id. at 
2, ¶ 4); 
 
d. “Any error of fact made by this Court in its March 10, 2015 Ruling 
does not affect the substantial rights of Aaron.”(Id. at 2, ¶ 5.)  
 
e. “Therefore, while this Court has the discretion to reconsider the award 
made in its March 10, 2015 Ruling, the Court declines to do so and stands on 
its previous Ruling.” ( Id. at 4, ¶ 19);  
 
21. On November 25, 2015 Aaron Smith filed a Notice of Appeal from the 
District Court’s ruling on October 27, 2015 and also its previous ruling of April 6, 2015. 
(Record at 1229.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction over this Appeal contesting both the District Court’s 
April 6, 2015 Order (“April Order,”) and the October 27, 2015 Order (“October Order.”)  
This is evident in three ways. First, the District Court addressed the combined filing by 
Aaron of materials associated with his U.R.C.P. Rule 59 Motion.  That filing stayed the 
time to appeal until the October Order.  Second, the October 27, 2015 Order materially and 
substantially modified the District Court’s prior ruling on April 6, 2015.  Thus, the filing 
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of an appeal from the October 27, 2015 Order is timely. The October Order by the court 
constituted a “new judgment [and] the time for appeal date[s] from the entry of that 
judgment.”11 Third, the District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to make a later 
determination of an amount of an award of fees, costs and expenses from prior Juvenile 
Court proceedings after the Appellate remand was completed by the Juvenile Court and its 
jurisdiction was terminated.   
The Juvenile Court did not certify and there was no request from Rocio for fees, 
costs and expenses. There was no reservation of such a right or claim pursuant to U.R.C.P. 
Rule 54(b). These matters were also never raised by cross-appeal or challenged through 
the remand proceedings in Juvenile Court.  The issue of the amount of fees, costs and 
expenses to be awarded was never delegated for future decision-making to the District 
Court.  There was no authority to do so.  The awarding of fees, costs and expenses is not 
included in shared jurisdictional authority pursuant to Utah Code § 78S-6-104. 
The District Court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the requested fees, 
costs and expenses. Determination of the amount to be awarded was a prerequisite to the 
subsequent assumption of jurisdiction by the District Court.  Having already terminated its 
jurisdiction, the Juvenile Court could not issue such a determination.  The District Court 
held no open ended jurisdiction or authority to alter or amend some prior ruling from the 
Juvenile Court, which was not raised on appeal and certainly not after remand when the 
                                                     
11Sittner v. Schriever, 2000 UT 45 ¶ 22, 23 P3d. 442. 
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Juvenile Court terminated its own jurisdiction, An award to be made pursuant to Utah Code 
§ 30-3-3(4) was and is no longer applicable.  
Even if the District Court somehow retained subject matter jurisdiction to 
independently consider the requested fees, costs and expenses, the District Court failed to 
limit a recoverable amount to those sums that Rocio claims to have specifically incurred 
because of the actions of Aaron instead of requiring his payment for those expenses which 
were predominantly incurred in her unsuccessful petition to terminate his parental rights.   
Further, the District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because it denied due 
process of law and failed to allow Aaron to fully and fairly present his objections and 
opposition to the Court.  
 For all the foregoing, the District Court did not have authority to award fees, costs 
and expenses in favor of the Rocio and against Aaron. 
LEGAL ARGUMENT 
I AARON’S APPEAL IS PROPERLY BEFORE THE COURT 
“The right to an appeal is a valuable constitutional right and ought not be denied 
except where it is clear the right has been lost or abandoned.”12 Pursuant to Utah Code 
§78A-4-103(2)(h), Aaron has a statutory right to appeal “domestic relations cases” from 
District Court to the Utah Court of Appeals.  The initial judgment of the District Court 
awarding fees, costs and expenses to Rocio was entered on April 6, 2015 (“April Order”) 
(A copy of the April Order is attached as Exhibit #1, and is incorporated herein by this 
reference).  After Aaron’s URCP Rule 59 Motion was filed, information not previously 
                                                     
12 Adamson v. Brockbank, 120 Utah 52, 60, 185 P.2d 264, 268 (1947). 
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disclosed by Rocio then came to light.   It was then brought to the Court’s attention that 
Rocio’s earlier motion was in fact untimely. The actual filing date was two days later 
than what Rocio stated in its motion to the Court.  Nonetheless, the District Court 
eventually denied the same in its order dated October 27, 2015. (“October Order”)  (A copy 
of the October Order is attached as Exhibit # 6, and is incorporated herein by this 
reference.)  That order is now appealed and Aaron’s notice of appeal was filed on 
November 25, 2015. 
A. Sufficiency of U.R.C.P. Rule 59 Motion to Stay Time for 
Appeal As a Matter of Discretion and of  Law 
“A motion is an application made to the Court for the purpose of obtaining a ruling 
or order directing some act to be done in favor of the applicant.”13 Based on the express 
language contained in the April Order, a primary purpose of the U.R.C.P. Rule 59 Motion 
was to bring to the District court’s attention the need for correction of a critical factual 
presumption.  Rocio’s motion for fees, costs and expenses was NOT timely filed in 
Juvenile Court.  The language of the April Order expressly presumed and confirmed what 
has since proven to be a material false and mistaken assumption.  The District Court 
suffered from previously undisclosed information.  Such mistake and misinformation 
justifies a finding that claims to attorney fees, costs and expenses were, in fact, waived by 
Rocio.  
                                                     
13 DeBry v. Fidelity Nat. Title Ins. Co., 828 P.2d 520, 524 (Utah App. 1992) (citation 
omitted.)  
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On October 27, 2015, the District denied Aaron’s Objection without hearing and 
oral argument as requested by Aaron.  The Court stated summarily “that the proposed 
order reflects the Court’s ruling accurately.”  Thus, without affirmatively indicating any 
non-compliance with U.R.C.P. Rule 59(e), the October Order merely states that “[t]his 
matter comes before this Court pursuant to Aaron’s (Aaron Smith) Motion Pursuant to 
U.R.C.P. Rule 59 filed April 21, 2015.” (NOTE: That date is in error.  It was filed 
electronically the day before).     
B. Material Differences Between  April Order and October Order Stay the Appeal 
Time.   
Because the October Order contained material differences from the April Order, 
the appeal time was thereby stayed.   
1. Authority of Court to Sua Sponte Correct and Issue New Orders.   
[A] judge has the inherent authority to ensure that his or her rulings are 
accurately memorialized and can correct misstatements of those rulings at 
any time, no matter how the error might come to his or her attention. All 
Courts of general jurisdiction have the discretion … ‘to recall and control 
its process, to direct and control its officers, including attorneys as such,’ 
for the purposes of ‘maintain[ing] and protect[ing] the integrity and 
dignity of the Court, . . . secur[ing] obedience to its rules and process, and . 
. . rebuk[ing] interference with the conduct of its business.’ Barnard v. 
Wassermann, 855 P.2d 243, 249 (Utah 1993) (first omission in original) 
(emphasis omitted) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).14 
 
There is no time restriction when necessary material information may be provided to the 
District Court.  Also, there is no restriction on who may propose or draw attention to the 
                                                     
14 Warner v. Warner, 2015 UT App 16, ¶ 27, 319 P.3d 711 
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need for correction.  The filings by Aaron in April of 2015 met this criterion.  He provided 
the matters and argument regarding the October Order.   
According to the practice of the Juvenile Court, the date stamp is placed on the 
documents on the date they are first received by the Court. The time stamp date on Rocio’s 
filings is May 15, 2013. Since the filing of the order was on April 29, 2013, it is now clear 
that the filing did not occur until sixteen (16) days after entry of the Order. In addition, the 
provisions of Rule 54 (d)(2) U. R.C.P. regarding fees and costs require service and filing 
in court be made within 14 days after the entry of judgment. The District Court accurately 
stated the following in its first ruling: “Aaron is correct when he argues that, if a party fails 
to submit a claim for attorney fees in a timely fashion, they may waive the attorney fee 
issue.” (Exhibit # 3, March 10, 2015 Ruling at 3.)  
Based on the foregoing, the filing by Rocio of the claim for fees and costs was 
untimely.  As such, neither Rocio nor the District Court may rely on the statements in the 
April 29, 2013 Order regarding fees and costs because of the failure of Rocio to timely file 
for the same in Juvenile Court.  At this juncture, continuing with the substantially identical 
request for fees and costs in District Court does not salvage and cannot excuse the failure 
to file on time in the Juvenile Court (the court of origin). 
2. October Order Constitutes a Modification or Amendment of Material Matter 
 
 The Utah Supreme Court has held “[w]here the modification or amendment is in 
some material matter, the time [for appeal] begins to run from the time of the modification 
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or ame4ndment.”15   Long-standing precedent reveals that when the full and accurate 
context is taken into account, even a nunc pro tunc motion to correct an error dismissing a 
party that occurred by reason of inadvertence and clerical mistake can be considered to be 
of a material nature.  
The right to an appeal is a valuable and constitutional right and are not to be 
denied except where it is clear the right has been lost or abandoned… Test 
in the case under consideration is whether or not this right of appeal is been 
lost.… 
[W]here a belated entry merely constitutes an amendment or modification 
not changing the substance or character of the judgment, such entry is merely 
an in pro trunk entry which relates back to the time the original judgment 
was entered, and does not enlarge the time for appeal; the modification or 
amendment is in some material matter, time begins to run from the time of 
the modification or amendment.… 
The modification or amendment in this case change and inconsistent 
judgments one of consistency, rendering the defendant Federal Homes, 
Inc., liable for and was previously some doubt existing as to its liability. In 
the opinion of the members of this Court, there was this was a sufficient 
importance to change the character of the judgment. The order amending 
the judgment was a modification of a material matter and enlarging a right 
running to the plaintiff. … The effect of this amendment was to create a 
new judgment for purposes of appeal, and the time in which an appeal can 
be taken commenced to run from the date of the entry of an nunc pro tunc 
order.16  
a.   The Defense of Waiver Was Treated as Being Valid 
in the April Order But Was Eliminated in the October Order 
 
Aaron submitted a Memorandum in Opposition to the request of Rocio for the 
District Court to award fees, costs and expenses.  Among other things, it was argued that 
the failure to timely submit a request to be awarded these monies served to waive any such 
                                                     
15 State v. Garner, 2005 UT 4, ¶ 11, 106 P.3d 729 (emphasis added.) 
16 Adamson v. Brockbank, 120 Utah 52, 59-61, 185 P.2d 264, 268 (1947).  
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claim of entitlement.  The following precedent was specifically reviewed and discussed as 
authorizing and supporting this conclusion:   
Lastly, Defendants assert that the trial Court erred by capping attorney fees 
and costs at $17,500 when the parties' promissory note provides that all fees 
are to be reimbursed to the prevailing party. The trial Court in its ruling 
awarded Defendants attorney fees and related costs reasonably incurred in an 
amount not to exceed $17,500, with the actual amount to be determined upon 
the submission of appropriate affidavits to the Court and Plaintiffs within ten 
days after the entry of the order. Plaintiffs claim that Defendants failed to 
request the allowance of any attorney fees in this case and therefore have 
waived the right to recover such fees. Indeed, Defendants did not submit a 
claim for attorney fees, and as a result, the trial Court did not award or 
determine an actual amount of attorney fees or costs to Defendants. Because 
Defendants did not submit a claim for attorney fees, they waived the attorney 
fee issue, and we do not address it.17 
In the reply of Rocio in support of the initial request for fees, costs and expenses, it was 
represented that  
 [t]his matter is clearly distinguishable from Kendall. In this matter, the 
mother submitted her claim for attorney’s fees and costs. The trial court 
[Juvenile Court] addressed a claim [and] indicated that it would err in 
ordering the amount of the fees, but not until the matters pending on appeal 
were addressed.18 
In the April Order, the Court used this argument to distinguish controlling precedent 
regarding waiver as follows: 
14. In Kendall, the Court of Appeals held that because the prevailing party 
did not submit a claim for attorney’s fees, they waived the attorney fees 
issues once the case went on appeal. Kendall Insurance, Inc. v. R & R 
Group, Inc., 2000 UT App 235, ¶ 29. 
                                                     
17 Kendall Insurance, Inc. v. R & R Group, Inc., 2008 UT App 235, ¶ 29, 189 P.3d 114. 
18 Reply Memorandum to Opposition to Motion by Rocio for Attorney Fees and Costs at 
4; Record at 1181 (Emphasis Added) 
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15. Aaron correctly argues that, if a party fails to submit a claim for 
attorney’s fees in a timely fashion, they may waived the attorney fee issues. 
Id. at ¶ 29. 
16. Unlike in Kendall, Respondent timely filed an affidavit for fees and 
costs less than two weeks after the Juvenile Court entered its order. 
17. In this matter, as [Respondent] did timely submit her Affidavit of 
Attorney Fees and Costs, thus, there was no waiver. 
 
* * * 
 
21. As the Juvenile Court retained the issue of fees and costs and Rocio 
timely submitted her request for attorney’s fees, the fees and costs were not 
waived. 
*** 
38. Respondent filed their affidavit [in] this case a May 3, 2013, only four 
days after the Juvenile Court’s April 29, 2013 Order.”   
 
(Exhibit #4, at ¶¶ 14-17, 21, 28.) A straightforward reading of these portions of the April 
Order leads to the inescapable conclusion that if the submission of the documentation of 
as filed with the Juvenile Court were not timely, they would have been waived.    
The Court’s early apparent endorsement of the doctrine of waiver and which 
favored Aaron, was significantly changed in the October Order.  In the later order, the 
Court apparently reversed and backtracked from its previous broad recognition of the 
waiver doctrine.  Instead, it now stated (summarily and without hearing or argument) it 
had “used the 14 day rule merely as a guideline for timeliness” (Exhibit # 6 at 3, ¶ 10,) 
and that “failure to submit a claim for attorney’s fees in a timely fashion may result in a 
waiver, not that it will.” (Exhibit # 6, at 2 ¶ 7.)    
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This change is both material and detrimental to Aaron as it eliminates what was  
previously recognized as a valid defense by the District Court.  
b.   The Full and Accurate Context of Undisclosed Information Provides Unique 
Evidence of Materiality  
 The March 10, 2015 ruling of the District Court and the April Order prepared by 
counsel for Rocio affirmatively dismissed the defense of waiver asserted by Aaron because 
the Court then relied on the representation of a timely filing in Juvenile Court.    After 
Rocio was confronted with the irrefutable evidence that the filing did not occur as stated in 
the rulings of the District Court, counsel responded as follows: “The Court already… found 
that the claimed attorney fees and their costs were timely submitted. Aaron has not 
demonstrated that the Court should disturb its prior finding and amend the award of 
attorney’s fees and costs.”19  This response makes it clear that but for the actions of Aaron, 
the erroneous factual assumptions in the District Court’s ruling and Order would not have 
been corrected.  Based on the foregoing obligations, the need to correct what Rocio failed 
to disclose, and resisted disclosing thereafter, was a material matter before the court. 
c. Even A Finding of No Substantial Right Does Not Preclude Materiality 
The District Court found that “[a]ny error of fact made by this Court in its March 
10, 2015 Ruling [and April Order] does not affect the substantial rights of Aaron[.]” 
(Exhibit #6 at 2 ¶ 5.) The District Court stated:    
[t]he received date stamps indicate that Rocio filed her affidavit 16 days after 
the entry of the Order, not within 14 days as this Court originally believed. 
However, under Utah Code § 30-3-3, the parties’ decree, and the order the 
Juvenile Court, this does not make a difference.  
                                                     
19 Opposition to U.R.C.P. Motion at 7; see Record at ____. 
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(Exhibit #6  at ____¶ 9.) 
For reasons that follow, reliance on the Code, the decree of divorce and the orders 
of the Juvenile Court do not provide the legal authority to uphold the District Court’s Order 
and award of fees, costs and expenses to Rocio. Because of this, Aaron has a “substantial 
right” to not be obligated to pay the ordered fees, costs and expenses. The provisions of 
U.R.C.P. Rule 61 do not justify the failure of the District Court to recognize and apply 
applicable law, which precludes such a judgment against Aaron.   
II. THE JUVENILE COURT HAS NO SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION TO 
DELEGATE DECISION-MAKING ON FEES, COSTS AND EXPENSES TO THE 
DISTRICT COURT 
 
 No certification regarding future action concerning fees, costs and expenses was 
ever made by the Juvenile Court to the District Court. Further, the Juvenile Court had no 
subject matter jurisdiction tor authority to delegate to the District Court its decision-
making regarding fees, costs and expenses arising from prior Juvenile Court proceedings.  
A.  On its Face, the Final Juvenile Court Order Did Not Certify the Question or 
Obligation for Finding Amount of Fees, Costs and Expenses to the District Court 
On March 17, 2014, Judge Sainsbury entered a final order titled Order of Hearing 
(January 16, 2014,) (hereinafter “Final Juvenile Court Order,” Exhibit #2. This completed 
his review on remand, finalized the case and terminated the jurisdiction of the Juvenile 
Court. The matter was then returned to the District Court as a normal ongoing Divorce 
proceeding with minor children.   
After years involving two competing private termination of parental rights petitions 
and a child welfare petition, the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court was terminated. In the 
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absence of additional child welfare claims that would subject the children and their parents 
to the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court, there would be no renewal of the jurisdiction of 
the Juvenile Court. There is no language in the Juvenile Court’ order stating that “issues of 
… attorney’s fees” were certified for resolution in the District Court.  In any event, the 
Juvenile Court could not have certified the request of Rocio for fees, costs and expenses. 
There was no reservation of her right pursuant to U.R.C.P. Rule 54(b). These matters were 
also never raised by cross-appeal nor challenged or contested in the remand proceedings in 
Juvenile Court.   
B. The Juvenile Court Lacked Authority To Certify To The District Court 
The Untimely and Improper Request Of Rocio For Attorney’s Fees 
 
1. There Is No Evidence of Juvenile Court Compliance with 
U.R.C.P. Rule 54(b) to Reserve A Claim Pre-Appeal 
  
An examination of the 2013 Final Juvenile Court Order confirms there was no 
compliance with the requirements of U.R.C.P. Rule 54(b). The Court’s ruling states, 
“[t]his is the FINAL ORDER of the Court pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
7(f)(2), and no additional order is necessary.” (Record at 0901.)  While an order 
complying with Rule 7(f) (2) U.R.C.P. does not preclude satisfying the strict 
requirements of Rule 54 (b) U.R.C.P., it did not occur in this case. 
 Rule 54 (b) U.R.C.P. requires that three conditions must be satisfied before an 
interlocutory appeal is to be certified as a final and appealable order.  See Utah R. Civ. P. 
Rule 54(b).  Only one of the three requirements applies here and thus no certification was 
warranted.  The first requirement is that “there must be multiple claims for relief or 
multiple Parties.” Id. This is satisfied in the opening paragraph of the Order where the 
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court indicated that three different petitions had been “at issue” in Juvenile Court 
proceedings.  
The second requirement is that “the order must be one that would otherwise have 
been appealable, but for the fact that there are other claims.” Id, The provisions of Rule 
52(b) Utah R. Juv. P. indicate that the Order was subject to an absolute right to appeal.    
“Appeals taken from juvenile court orders related to abuse, neglect, dependency, [and] 
termination … proceedings must be filed within 15 days of the entry of the order appealed 
from.” Id. Thus, the Juvenile Court Order was subject to a direct appeal.  Aaron exercised 
the right to appeal.  No “other claims” of any party interfered with the appeal. Rocio cannot 
demonstrate that there were “other claims” that would have prevented an appeal to be taken 
regarding fees, costs and expenses. 
The third requirement is that the trial court must articulate in the order an express 
determination that there is no just reason to delay the interlocutory appeal. Id. On its  face, 
it is evident that the April 23, 2013 Order contains neither findings nor the conclusory 
language required under U.R.C.P. Rule 54(b).  In addition, Utah Supreme Court precedent 
indicates that they are to make a finding as to the amount of financial liability.  This, too, 
precluded certification pursuant to U.R.C.P. Rule 54(b). 
The trial court reserved the question of damages on the guarantee claim 
against Bonneville and made no determinations as to the claims against the 
other defendants in the case. Bonneville appeals. Because only a portion of 
the claims against Bonneville was resolved by the trial court's ruling, the 
question of the remedy remaining to be determined, we find that the summary 
judgment ruling failed to dispose completely  of  either  a  claim  or  a  party  
as required by rule 54(b). Therefore, the order is not final and cannot be 
appealed to this court. 
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2.   Failure of Rocio to Cross-appeal Precludes Claimed Entitlement 
to Fees, Costs or Expenses 
 
 Utah R. App. P. Rule 52(b) states that in a child welfare proceeding, “[a] notice 
of cross appeal may be filed within the 15 days for filing a notice of appeal or within 5 
days after a notice of appeal is filed, whichever period last expires.”  The April 29, 2013 
Order was appealed by Aaron on May 13, 2013.  Rocio had until May 18, 2013, to cross 
appeal the Juvenile Court’s failure to award an amount of fees, costs and expenses.   She 
did not do so. “Because the [she] did not cross-appeal the [juvenile] court's judgment, 
which did not award fees, [she is] not entitled to any fees or costs associated with the 
prior proceedings before the [juvenile] court.”20  This is because  
[i]n an instance where the court has appellate jurisdiction, an appellant must 
allege the lower court committed an error that the appellate court should 
correct. If an appellant does not challenge a final order of the lower court 
on appeal, that decision will be placed beyond the reach of further review.21 
 
3. The Juvenile Court Could Not Substitute The District Court 
For Itself as Relates to Future Action on its Final Order 
 
 After failing to apply and mistakenly abandoning its earlier recognition of the 
waiver doctrine,  the District Court cited instead the statutory provisions of Utah Code 
§30-3-3 to justify its award of attorney fees, costs and expenses.  However, those 
financial awards may only be made  “during the course of the action or in the final order 
or judgment.” Utah Code §30-3-3 (4).  Rocio did not file for fees, costs and expenses 
during the course of the action, final judgment or order that was filed by the Juvenile 
                                                     
20 Duke v. Graham, 2007 UT 31 ¶ 32, 158 P.3d 540. 
21 Allen v. Friel, 2008 UT 56, ¶ 7, 194 P.3d 903. 
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Court on April 29, 2013. Rocio failed to raise the issue of fees, costs and expenses on 
remand when the prior sanctions were vacated.  Having failed to seek in Juvenile Court 
an award of fees, costs and expenses prior to appeal, or on cross-appeal, or during 
consideration of the case after remand, Rocio did not take the necessary steps to fulfill the 
jurisdictional requirement for an award of fees, costs and expenses.  It had to occur 
during the “course of the action or in the final order or judgment” that was part of the 
Juvenile Court proceedings, the 2013 Juvenile Court Order, and those matters addressed 
in the Final Order following remand. .  
In 2004, the Utah Supreme Court determined that a Juvenile Court, which  
terminated custody in an adoption proceeding, did not have subject matter jurisdiction “to 
enforce a pre-adoption visitation order… hear an order to show cause… [or] award 
attorney’s fees.”22  In this case, on March 17, 2014, the Juvenile Court terminated its 
jurisdiction over the parties and their children. Following similar analysis, in this case, the 
final Juvenile Court Order eliminated the jurisdictional authority of the Juvenile Court to 
revisit any award of fees, costs and expenses.  As the Juvenile Court was without 
jurisdictional authority, it follows that the District Court could not claim some form of 
legally recognized delegated authority from the Juvenile Court to enter an award as now 
claimed and requested by the Rocio. 
 
 
                                                     
22 State of Utah ex rel. B.B., 2004 UT 39 ¶ 20, 94 P.3d 39. 
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III. THE DISTRICT COURT HAS NO SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION 
TO AWARD FEES, COSTS AND EXPENSES IN PRIOR JUVENILE COURT 
PROCEEDINGS  
 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that the District Court’s:  
lack of jurisdiction is alone sufficient to void its judgment, and there is no 
need for … setting it aside under Rule 60(b)(4).  A showing of lack of 
jurisdiction, in other words, could never be futile, as a jurisdictional defect is 
enough by itself to void the judgment.23  
The repeated “substance” of the assertions herein establishes the claim of a jurisdictional 
defect.24 
THE PRIOR REVIEW BY THE COURT OF APPEALS AND REMAND TO THE 
JUVENILE COURT ON THE LIMITED ISSUE OF POSSIBLE CONTEMPT 
FINDINGS PRECLUDES ANY CLAIM OF LATER JURISDICTION AND 
AUTHORITY OF THE DISTRICT COURT TO AWARD ATTORNEY FEES AND 
COSTS RETROACTIVELY IN FORMER PROCEEDINGS IN ANOTHER COURT.  
A. District Court Lacks Jurisdiction to Alter Final Judgment on Remand  
In 2015, the Utah Court of Appeals stated that a District Court lacks subject matter 
jurisdiction to alter a judgment that had been ruled upon by an appellate court. 
[¶26] Therefore, the 2013 Order attempting to award post-September 2004 
rents did not enforce, but rather altered, the 2004 Amended Judgment. 
Because the 2004 Amended Judgment was a final judgment affirmed on 
appeal, the district court lacked jurisdiction to alter it. See Mid-America 
Pipeline Co. v. Four-Four, Inc., 2009 UT 43, ¶ 13, 216 P.3d 352; Frost v. 
District Court of First Judicial Dist., 96 Utah 106, 83 P.2d 737, 740 (Utah 
1938). " A judgment or order entered by a court lacking subject matter 
                                                     
23 Judson v. Wheeler RV Las Vegas, L.L.C., 2012 UT 6, ¶ 15, 270 P.3d 456 
24 Judson v. Wheeler RV Las Vegas, L.L.C., 2012 UT 6, ¶ 21, 270 P.3d 456 
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jurisdiction is void and does not affect the rights of any party." State v. 
Vaughn, 2011 UT App. 411, ¶ 12, 266 P.3d 202. Accordingly, the 2013 
Order is void, and we vacate that order.25 
The 2013 Final Juvenile Court Order did not provide for an amount of fees, costs or 
expenses to be awarded to Rocio. The Appellate also did not mandate such an award.. 
Rocio did not appeal or take any other action challenging the Final Order on remand.  . The 
later award by the District Court of fees, costs and expenses to Rocio matches the same 
prohibited pattern of the district court cited above.  It “did not enforce, but rather altered,” 
the previous judgment. Because the District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to do 
so, it is “void and does not affect the rights of any party.” 
B. Termination of the Juvenile Court Jurisdiction Eliminates Ability to Make Award 
 On March 17, 2014, Judge Sainsbury entered a final order named Order of 
Hearing (January 16, 2014,) (hereinafter “Final Juvenile Court Order” Exhibit #2.). This 
completed his review on remand, finalized the case and terminated the jurisdiction of the 
Juvenile Court.  He ruled as follows: “The jurisdiction of the juvenile court is terminated 
and [the case] is referred back to the district court.” (Exhibit #2  at  3, ¶ 14.) Neither 
party filed a request for certification under U.R.C.P. Rule 54(b) of any post-judgment 
motions, an appeal from the Final Order or conclusion of all Juvenile Court proceedings.   
In 2004, the Utah Supreme Court determined that a Juvenile Court that had 
terminated custody over an adoption proceeding, did not have subject matter jurisdiction 
“to enforce a pre-adoption visitation order… hear an order to show cause… [or] award 
                                                     
25 Mardanlou v. Ghaffarian, 2015 UT App. 128 ¶ 26, 351 P.3d 114 (emphasis added.) 
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attorney’s fees.”26  “[O]nce legal relationship of parent and child is established, Juvenile 
Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction with the adopted child to the requirements for 
jurisdiction are satisfied.”27 The Juvenile Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.  Thus, it 
could neither enforce previous agreements nor award attorney fees, costs and expenses 
because it had terminated its own jurisdiction over the parties.  
In similar fashion, the Juvenile Court terminated its jurisdiction over Aaron, Rocio 
and their children. In he same manner, there is no exclusive jurisdictional authority of the 
Juvenile Court defined under Utah Code § 78A-6-103.  There is no basis for the suggestion 
that the Juvenile Court could somehow transfer to another court the responsibility and 
authority to determine the amount of fees, costs and expenses incurred in prior Juvenile 
Court proceedings and when the Juvenile Court itself did not do so.  . There is no indication 
under Utah Code §76A-6-104 that the District Court and Juvenile Court shared 
jurisdictional authority to make such a finding and award in this case.   
C Without Juvenile Court  Determination of Amount, District Court Does Not Have 
Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
In the 2014 case o5f Zelig v. Uintah County, the Utah Court of Appeals  
recognized that  Utah Code §78 B-1-151 (3) grants the Juvenile Court authority to 
determine the amount of the expert witness fee the party responsible for paying the fee. 
Therefore, we conclude that the Juvenile Court – the court that heard the 
underlying case and appointed the expert in the first place – was the 
appropriate court to determine the reasonableness of the work Doctor Zelig 
performed, said his fee, and determine who was responsible for payment.  
                                                     
26 State of Utah ex. rel. B.B., 2004 UT 39 ¶ 20, 94 P.3d 39. 
27 State of Utah ex rel. B.B., 2004 UT 39 ¶ 17,  94 P.3d 39. 
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Because we vacate the district court’s judgment concluded his never 
properly before it, we need not reach the other issues that Uintah County 
raised on appeal.… We therefore also conclude that in the instant case, and 
the time and the posture it was brought, was never properly before the 
district court. We therefore vacate its judgment.28 
In similar fashion, the Juvenile Court in this case had sole  responsibility for setting the 
amount of attorney’s fees, costs and expenses applicable to those proceedings over which 
it had sole, exclusive jurisdiction.   
IV. The Subject Award is Void Because the District Court Failed to Afford 
Due Process to Aaron 
 
 Aaron recognizes that  
[a] judgment is not void merely because it is erroneous." Wright & Miller, 
supra, § 2862. Rather, a " judgment is void under rule 60(b)(4) if the court 
that rendered it lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter or parties, or the 
judgment was entered without the notice required by due process."  
 
Due process requires notice reasonably calculated, under all the 
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action 
and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.29 
 
“Thus, due process requires … a meaningful opportunity to be heard in the course of 
[court] proceedings.”30  Without the allocation of fees costs and expenses and identifying 
prevailing parties and claims and no hearing and oral argument as requested, he was 
                                                     
28 Zelig v. Uintah County, 2014 UT App 69 ¶¶ 7-8, 323P.3d 610. 
29 Migliore v. Livingston Financial LLC, 2015 UT 9 ¶¶ 26-27, 347  P.3d 394 (citations 
and internal quote marks omitted.) 
30 In re Adoption of J.S., 2014 UT 51 ¶ 29, 358 P.3d 109 (footnote omitted) (emphasis 
added.) 
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deprived of a meaningful opportunity to object. His procedural due process rights were 
denied and not met.     
 Included in his initial Opposition to the request for fees, costs and expenses, Aaron 
objected to the lack of a proper allocation and adequate notice of the claim.:  “Since she 
has not prevailed on all counts, or is not entitled to attorney fees on all counts, this court 
“may not award wholesale all attorney’s fees requested that have not been allocated as to 
separate claims and/or parties.”31 “If not allocated, fees may be denied altogether.”32  It is 
further argued:  
It also does not appear that costs have been timely applied for. Pursuant to 
Rule 54(d) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, notice of the claim and ability to 
object to the actual amounts claimed must be allowed.  As no timely notice 
was allowed, the claim must be denied.33 
Since the amounts were not allocated or ruled upon in any respect by the Juvenile Court, 
there is a denial of due process by not requiring this procedure and adherence to 
controlling precedent.   Aaron has been denied the right to have a “meaningful” 
opportunity” to address the claim for fees, costs and expenses. 
 The District Court also refused to grant a hearing to Aaron to address the 
fundamental contested matters before an award of fees, costs and expenses. An award of 
attorney fees, costs and expenses is a matter of equity and is subject to the discretion of 
the court. Aaron was denied due process of law when his request for a hearing was 
                                                     
31 Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 318 (Utah 1998). 
32 Commerce Financial v. Markwest Corp., 806  P.2d 200, 204 n. 4  (Utah. App. 1990). 
33 Memorandum in Opposition to Motion by Respondent for Attorney Fees and Costs, 
and 8; Record at ____. 
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denied.  He was entitled to establish his present financial status, and provide evidence as 
to why the failure of the Rocio to prevail on her efforts to terminate his parental rights is 
a substantial reason to discount or eliminate such a large amount given all the errors and 
missing grounds or authority for such action by the District court.  . 
 Whether speaking of the April Order or the October Order, the District Court’s 
failure to provide adequate notice and explanation of allocated fees, costs and expenses in 
relation to what may legally and equitably be recognized as a prevailing party and claim 
and the financial condition of the party to be charged with such a financial burden and the  
District Court’s failure to have an evidentiary hearing as requested, these denials of due 
process are sufficient to set aside both Orders under U.R.C.P. 60(b)(4).  A separate motion 
is not required when matters before the District Court raise all the abundantly evident issues 
associated with this claim. 
CONCLUSION 
Both parties sought in Juvenile court to terminate the other’s parental rights and 
neither party prevailed on those claims. The case was ultimately closed by the Juvenile 
court while also terminating its jurisdiction. The case was returned to the District Court 
for further post-divorce proceedings if needed in relation to the children. Appellee’s 
current ongoing attempt to immediately charge, garnish, seize, attach and collect more 
than $189,000.00 is unconscionable.  Reversal and correction by the Court of Appeals is 
respectfully sought and duly requested.   
 
 
40 of 43 
DATED March 14, 2016. 
Law Office of F. LaVar Christensen 
 
    ______________________________________  
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ADDENDUM 
 
Exhibit # 1 Final Contempt Order 
Exhibit # 2 Order of Hearing (January 16, 2014) (“Final Juvenile Court Order”). 
Exhibit # 3 Ruling of District Court on March 10, 2015 (“March Ruling”) 
Exhibit # 4 April 6, 2015 District Court Order (“April Order”) 
Exhibit # 5 Ruling of  the District Court on September 28, 2015 (“September Ruling”) 
Exhibit # 6    October 27, 2015 District Court Order (“October Order”) 
Exhibit # 7 Decree of Divorce Between Aaron and Rocio 
Exhibit # 8 Court Docketing Statement 
 
 
 
 
 
 



































































